Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180832
Authors: 
Clougherty, Joseph A.
Duso, Tomaso
Lee, Miyu
Seldeslachts, Jo
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economic Inquiry [Volume:] 54 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 1884-1903 [ISSN:] 1465-7295
Abstract: 
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.
Published Version’s DOI: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)
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