Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071 
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:10Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071-
dc.description.abstractThis note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x335en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSteuersystemen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn849707862en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp335en

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