Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18065 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:08Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18065-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x329en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuerpolitiken
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungen
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleVoting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn849560101en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp329en

Files in This Item:
File
Size
268.74 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.