Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/180482 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11464
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper examines how traditional marriage market institutions affect households' financial decisions. We study how bride-to-groom marriage payments, i.e., dowries, influence saving behavior in rural India. Exploiting variation in firstborn gender and heterogeneity in dowry amounts across marriage markets, we find that the prospect of paying higher dowry increases household savings, which are primarily financed through increased paternal labor supply. This is the first paper that highlights this alternative motive for savings in dowry-paying societies. However, we find no impacts of dowry expectations on son-preferring fertility behaviors and investments in girls.
Subjects: 
household savings
dowry
marriage payments
India
labor supply
fertility
sex ratio
child investments
JEL: 
J1
D14
O15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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