Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180324
Authors: 
Suzuki, Ken-ichi
Itaya, Jun-ichi
Yamanashi, Akitomo
Miyakoshi, Tatsuyoshi
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7062
Abstract: 
This study shows the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the model of multiple voluntarily supplied public goods with potential contributors possessing different Cobb-Douglas preferences. This study provides a sufficient condition for uniqueness using graph theory. This sufficient condition allows us to use the replacement function approach of Cornes and Hartley (2007) not only to develop an algorithm for identifying free riders, but also to provide an alternative proof for the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in multiple public goods models.
Subjects: 
public good
voluntary provision
uniqueness
aggregate game
Nash equilibrium
algorithm
JEL: 
H41
F13
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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