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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7047
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
I study an indefinitely repeated game where firms differ in size. Attempts to form cartels in such an environment, for example by rationing outputs in a manner linked to firm size differences, have generally struggled. Any successful cartel has to set production shares in a manner that ensures no firm will defect. But this can require allocating sellers disproportionate shares, which in turn makes these tacit agreements difficult to create and enforce. I analyze some experimental evidence in support of this last proposition.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric cartel
repeated game
experiments
JEL: 
D80
L15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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