Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180276
Authors: 
Dhami, Sanjit
Wei, Mengxing
al-Nowaihi, Ali
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 7014
Abstract: 
We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method’ and a within-subjects design, using the strategy method. We find that all our psychological variables contribute towards the explanation of contributions. Guilt-aversion is pervasive at the individual-level and the aggregate-level and it is relatively more important than surprise-seeking. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.
Subjects: 
public goods games
psychological game theory
reciprocity
surprise-seeking/guilt-aversion
attribution of intentions
induced beliefs method
within and between subjects designs
JEL: 
D01
D03
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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