Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/180243 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6981
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Adding to the literature on factors driving corruption and bribery, this paper examines the effect of contestability in business operations on bribe solicitations. Contestability undermines bureaucratic rent-seeking potential and this paper tries to capture this empirically using cross-country survey data. Results show that the relatively greater contestability of business startup procedures compared to startup regulatory times led to fewer bribe demands; however, property registration regulations with lower relative contestability led to more bribe demands, especially for import licenses. Finally, older and larger firms received lower bribe demands, ceteris paribus.
Schlagwörter: 
bribery
corruption
contestability
import licenses
operating licenses
regulation
JEL: 
K42
D73
M21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
391.41 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.