Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/180243 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6981
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Adding to the literature on factors driving corruption and bribery, this paper examines the effect of contestability in business operations on bribe solicitations. Contestability undermines bureaucratic rent-seeking potential and this paper tries to capture this empirically using cross-country survey data. Results show that the relatively greater contestability of business startup procedures compared to startup regulatory times led to fewer bribe demands; however, property registration regulations with lower relative contestability led to more bribe demands, especially for import licenses. Finally, older and larger firms received lower bribe demands, ceteris paribus.
Subjects: 
bribery
corruption
contestability
import licenses
operating licenses
regulation
JEL: 
K42
D73
M21
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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