Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179911 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
QUCEH Working Paper Series No. 2018-07
Verlag: 
Queen's University Centre for Economic History (QUCEH), Belfast
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a new biography of banks, we examine the stability of Irish banking from 1797 to 1826 by constructing a failure rate series. We find that the ultimate cause of the frequent and severe banking crises was the crisis-prone structure of the banking system, which was designed to benefit the political elite. There is little evidence to suggest that wildcat banking or the failure of the Bank of Ireland to act as a lender of last resort were to blame. We also find that the main economic effect of the episodic crises was major diminutions in the money supply.
Schlagwörter: 
banking crisis
bank failure
Ireland
partnership
wildcat banking
political economy of banking
JEL: 
G21
E42
N13
N23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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