Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179561
Authors: 
Pantoja, Gabriela S.
Penaloza, Rodrigo S.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] EconomiA [ISSN:] 1517-7580 [Volume:] 15 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 30-40
Abstract: 
We study the strategic interactions between the fiscal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We fit this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns.
Abstract (Translated): 
Neste trabalho estudamos as interações entre o contribuinte e o fisco no que diz respeito à evasão fiscal e à auditoria. Para isso, construímos um jogo bayesiano e introduzimos a hipótese de consistência comportamental, que reduz o conjunto de estratégias e modela o fato estilizado segundo o qual a evasão ou não evasão está sujeita a padrões comportamentais.
Subjects: 
Tax evasion
Bayesian equilibrium
Behavioral consistency
JEL: 
H26
D82
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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