Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/17949 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChami, Ralphen
dc.contributor.authorSharma, Sunilen
dc.contributor.authorShim, Ilhyocken
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:05:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:05:09Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/17949-
dc.description.abstractThe paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF´s objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan´s dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Lear´s dilemma.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2007-26en
dc.subject.jelG22en
dc.subject.jelF02en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIMFen
dc.subject.keywordcoinsurance arrangementen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordSamaritan´s dilemmaen
dc.subject.keywordKing Lear´s dilemmaen
dc.titleA Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558292844en
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5731en

Files in This Item:
File
Size
322.03 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.