Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179445
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Tejada, Oriol
Mamageishvili, Akaki
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 17/283
Abstract: 
Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may not provide effective protection against a malevolent adversary trying to buy real ballots. If the citizenry is divided into subgroups (or districts), the adversary can construct a so-called "Devil's Menu" consisting of several prices. In equilibrium, the adversary can buy the real ballots of any strict subset of districts at a price corresponding to the willingness to sell on the part of the citizens holding such ballots. By contrast, decoy voters are trapped into selling their ballots at a low, or even negligible, price. Blowing up the adversary's budget by introducing decoy ballots may thus turn out to be futile. The Devil's Menu can also be applied to the well-known "Lemons Problem".
Subjects: 
voting
decoy votes
adversary
electronic voting
attacks
lemons market
JEL: 
C72
D4
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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