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Autoren: 
Cerqueti, Roy
Sabatini, Fabio
Ventura, Marco
Datum: 
2017
Reihe/Nr.: 
EERI Research Paper Series 13/2017
Zusammenfassung: 
We model how the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers' support for welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.
Schlagwörter: 
Welfare state
redistribution
tax surveillance
trust
civic capital
social capital
JEL: 
H10
H53
D63
D69
Z1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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