Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179385 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
EERI Research Paper Series No. 06/2016
Publisher: 
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels
Abstract: 
Local governors who hold office for longer periods are thought to be more likely to collude with various groups to increase their own benefit through long-term interaction. There is no term limit for local governors in Japan, seemingly causing such collusive behavior. However, since 1987, local government at the prefecture level has begun to promulgate public information disclosure ordinances, which is anticipated to prevent collusive behavior. As of 2001, all 47 local governments have promulgated their local ordinances. This paper uses a prefecture-level dataset from 1987 and 2001 to explore whether the number of years that local governors hold office is associated with the timing of the promulgation of public information disclosure ordinances. The major finding using survival regression analysis is that the longer local governors hold office, the less likely the ordinance is promulgated. This highlights the policy implication that the term of local governors should be limited.
Subjects: 
Multiple terms
information-disclosure ordinance
collusion
survival regression analysis
JEL: 
G38
P48
C41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.