Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179361 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 17-03
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
For many products, platforms enable sellers to transact with buyers. We show that the competitive conditions among sellers shape the market structure in platform industries. If product market competition is tough, sellers avoid competitors by joining different platforms. This allows platforms to sustain high fees and explains why, for example, in some online markets, several homogeneous platforms segment the market. Instead, if product market competition is soft, agglomeration on a single platform emerges, and platforms fight for the dominant position. These insights give rise to novel predictions. For instance, market concentration and fees are negatively correlated in platform industries, which inverts the standard logic of competition.
Schlagwörter: 
intermediation
two-sided markets
market structure
price competition
endogenous segmentation
JEL: 
L13
D43
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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