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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-23
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Many companies try to access personal information to discriminate among consumers. We analyse how privacy regulations affect the acquisition and disclosure of information in a simple game of persuasion. Theory predicts that no data will be acquired with Disclosure Duty of collected data whereas Consent Law with perfect privacy results in complete information acquisition. Imperfect privacy, i.e., an environment in which leaks of collected data are possible, gives rise to multiple equilibria. Results from a laboratory experiment confirm the qualitative differences between Consent Law and Disclosure Duty and show that imperfect privacy does not stop people from collecting personal information.
Schlagwörter: 
data privacy
endogenous information acquisition
experiment
unravelling
health
JEL: 
C90
D80
D82
I10
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