Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179162 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 1-22
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.
Subjects: 
institution formation
laboratory experiment
plurality voting
public-goods game
unanimity voting
JEL: 
C91
C92
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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