Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/178628
Authors: 
Demuth, Juri
Friederiszick, Hans
Reinhold, Steffen
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
ESMT Working Paper 18-02
Abstract: 
After earlier waves of privatization, local governments have increasingly taken back control of local service provisions in some sectors and countries and, instead, started providing those services themselves (reverse privatization). Using a unique panel data set on the mode of service provision for solid waste collection for German municipalities covering the years 2003, 2009, and 2015, we investigate motives for reverse privatization. Our results show that, in deciding whether to insource or not, municipalities react to the cost advantages of private suppliers as well as to the competitive environment, with more switching to insourcing in concentrated markets. Furthermore, we find local contagion effects, that is, insourcing is more likely if municipalities close by also provide services themselves, whether in horizontally or vertically-related markets. Implications for competition law enforcement are discussed.
Subjects: 
local privatization
state-owned enterprises
competition law enforcement
mergers
logit regression
JEL: 
L33
L44
L88
H44
K21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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