Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/178285 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Operations Research Perspectives [ISSN:] 2214-7160 [Volume:] 4 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 142-148
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
In this paper we study non cooperative games with potential as introduced by Monderer and Shapley in 1996. We extend the notions of weighted and ordinal potential games to a multicriteria setting and study their Pareto equilibria. The importance of these games is the existence of Pareto equilibria in pure strategies and in the finite case and the approximate equilibria for some classes of infinite potential games. Some applications are studied via potential games: a water resource problem, a voluntary contribution model, peering games for telecommunication models.
Subjects: 
Multicriteria games
Pareto equilibria
Weighted potential
Ordinal potential
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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