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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1117
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist's incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.
Schlagwörter: 
Double-sided moral hazard
public equity
venture capital
JEL: 
L14
G28
G24
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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