Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177728 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2018-038/IV
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We empirically investigate why wholesale funding is fragile by providing the first study of how individual banks borrow and lend in the euro unsecured and secured interbank market. Consistent with theories in which lenders enforce market discipline by monitoring counterparty credit risk and theories highlighting that secured loans are less informational sensitive, we find that banks with low credit worthiness replace unsecured borrowing with secured loans. Moreover, riskier lenders provide more secured loans to replace unsecured lending, which is not consistent with speculative or precautionary liquidity hoarding theories. Instead, lenders are precautionary in the sense that they prefer to lend against safe collateral.
Schlagwörter: 
Liquidity hoarding
asymmetric information
counterparty credit risk
wholesale funding fragility
interbank market
liquidity
JEL: 
E42
E43
E58
G01
G21
G28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
540.72 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.