Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177610 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 2000
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We revisit the well known differential Cournot game with polluting emissions dating back to Benchekroun and Long (1998), proposing a version of the model in which environmental taxation is levied on emissions rather than the environmental damage. This allows to attain strong time consistency under open-loop information, and yields two main results which can be summarized as follows: (i) to attain a fully green technology in steady state, the regulator may equivalently adopt an appropriate tax rate (for any given number of firms) or regulate market access (for any given tax rate); (ii) if the environmental damage depends on emissions only (i.e., not on industry output) then the aggregate green R&D effort takes an inverted-U shape, in accordance with Aghion et al. (2005), and the industry structure maximising aggregate green innovation also minimises individual and aggregate emissions.
Schlagwörter: 
pollution
green R&D
emission taxation
differential games
JEL: 
C73
H23
L13
O31
Q52
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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