Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177605 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1116
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
Thanks to new digital technologies, web users are continuously targeted by offers that potentially fit their interests even if they are not actively looking for a product. Does this matching always promote transactions with high social value? We consider a model in which web users with state-contingent preferences are targeted by relevant banners. We characterize the optimal strategy of a seller who, in addition to the price of the offered good, designs a banner. We show that, in equilibrium, there is a positive relationship between the price of the offered good and the accuracy of the banner sent to users. Then, we consider the strategic decision of a Platform that attracts sellers because of its targeting abilities and we underline that a reduction in seller's costs may translate into less informative banners and lower prices,fueling purchases of goods that rational individuals may regret due to the persuasive nature of banners.
Schlagwörter: 
Bayesian Persuasion
Targeting
Platforms
JEL: 
D80
D82
D83
L10
M37
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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