Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177409 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Wirtschaftsdienst [ISSN:] 1613-978X [Volume:] 96 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 193-197
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Innerhalb einer Währungsunion ist eine souveräne nationale Geldpolitik nicht möglich. Solange die einzelnen Länder sich in verschiedenen ökonomischen Situationen befi nden, wirkt sich auch die gemeinsame Geldpolitik unterschiedlich aus. Sind die Länder zu heterogen, kann die gemeinsame Geldpolitik zu verstärkter Divergenz führen. Der Autor hat die Entwicklung der Konvergenz und Divergenz innerhalb der Europäischen Währungsunion empirisch untersucht.
Abstract (Translated): 
From the beginning of EMU, it has been obvious that the currency area does not constitute an optimum currency area. Instead, hope was put on further convergence after its start. Yet, thus far there is no sign of area-wide convergence. In light of the continuing crisis, which is above all a crisis of missing competitiveness, the claim for convergence is also obsolete, because the divergent development of earlier years must first be equalised via divergent development in the opposite direction.
JEL: 
E31
E52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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