Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177257 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 005.2018
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness, the comparative statics, and the approximation of a Nash equilibrium are determined by a precise relationship between the lowest eigenvalue of the network, a measure of players' payoff concavity, and a parameter capturing the strength of the strategic interaction among players. We apply our framework to the study of aggregative network games, games of mixed interactions, and Bayesian network games.
Subjects: 
Network Games
Variational Inequalities
Lowest Eigenvalue
Shock Propagation
JEL: 
C72
D85
H41
C61
C62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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