Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177168 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11364
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes.
Subjects: 
break-up of groups
decision rights
voting behavior
public goods
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D72
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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