Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177128 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11324
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper investigates how upward mobility affects legislator voting behavior towards education policies. We develop an electoral competition model where voters are altruistic parents and politicians are office seeking. In this setting the future economic status of the children is affected both by current public education spending and by the level of upward mobility. Using a newly compiled dataset of roll call voting on California education legislation matched with electoral district-level upward mobility we find that the likelihood of a legislator voting "no" on redistributive education bills decreases by 10 percentage points when upward mobility in his electoral district decreases by a standard deviation.
Subjects: 
upward income mobility
education policies
legislator voting behavior
roll call votes
California
JEL: 
I24
D72
H4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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