Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177031 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11227
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Using a negatively framed public good game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation when it is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish.
Subjects: 
ostracism
exclusion
reintegration
social dilemma
cooperation
experiment
JEL: 
C92
H41
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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