Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/176959
Authors: 
Aronsson, Thomas
Blomquist, Sören
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6940
Abstract: 
In this paper, we consider how the hours of work and retirement age ought to respond to a change in the uncertainty of the length of life. In a first best framework, where a benevolent government exercises perfect control over the individuals’ labor supply and retirement-decisions, the results show that a decrease in the standard deviation of life-length leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age and a decrease in the hours of work per period spent working. This result is robust, and is also derived in models of decentralized decision-making where individuals decide on their own consumption, labor supply, and retirement age, and where the government attempts to affect their behavior and welfare through redistribution and pension policy.
Subjects: 
uncertain lifetime
retirement age
work hours
pension policy
JEL: 
D61
D80
H21
H55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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