Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/176868 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 248
Publisher: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Abstract: 
This paper develops a model of tax competition with three countries, which initially form a union where countries refrain from using different tax rates in different sectors of the economy. We study the impact of one country leaving the union. We show that the introduction of discriminatory taxation in one country increases tax policy heterogeneity within the remaining union. Moreover, the incentives for the two remaining countries to harmonize their tax rates decline. We discuss these results in the context of the debate about the tax policy implications of Brexit.
Subjects: 
International taxation
tax competition
preferential tax regimes
JEL: 
H20
H73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.