Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/176427 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Financial Innovation [ISSN:] 2199-4730 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 17 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-8
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Background: Prosocial crowdfunding helps the underprivileged obtain non-profit seeking loans from multitudinous lenders. Some platforms introduce team competition to motivate member participation and may thus induce team rivalry. Methods: We investigate how team rivalry affects lending decisions using data from Kiva.org. We argue that a rivalry relationship may engage teams to compete directly against rivals by lending to the same project or prevent them from doing so because they intend not to cooperate. Result: We find that a team is less likely to lend to a project that has received funding from its rival team, suggesting that rival teams tend to avoid cooperation. Conclusions: We discuss the implications of our findings for crowdfunding and competition-based motivation mechanisms in general.
Subjects: 
Crowdfunding
Prosocial lending
Rivalry relationship
Lending decision
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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