Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175695 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2071
Publisher: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors.
Subjects: 
lobbying
regulation
political economy
JEL: 
D72
D78
O38
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-2793-2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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