Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175641
Authors: 
Ehlert, Andree
Wein, Thomas
Zweifel, Peter
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Health Economics Review [ISSN:] 2191-1991 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 19 [Pages:] 1-9
Abstract: 
Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'three-player/three-cake' game the coalitions {SHI, MCO}, {MCO, RI}, and {SHI, RI} can form. Players' possibility to switch between coalitions creates new outside options, causing the conventional bilateral Nash bargaining solution to be replaced by the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern triple. These triples are compared to the status quo (where the RI has no threat potential) and related to institutional conditions characterizing Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
Subjects: 
Managed care Game theory
Multilateral Nash bargaining
Health insurance
Consumer choice
Healthcare reform
Germany
The Netherlands
Switzerland
JEL: 
I13
I11
D02
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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