Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175367 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2018-201
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated - in terms of number of assignments - in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and assign weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide comparisons with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those show that the difference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms and others in the literature is large and significant.
Schlagwörter: 
market design
matching
maximal matching
fairness
object allocation
school choice
JEL: 
D47
C78
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
422.32 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.