Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175367
Authors: 
Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz
Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari
Turhan, Bertan
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2018-201
Abstract: 
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated - in terms of number of assignments - in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and assign weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide comparisons with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those show that the difference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms and others in the literature is large and significant.
Subjects: 
market design
matching
maximal matching
fairness
object allocation
school choice
JEL: 
D47
C78
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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