Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175235
Authors: 
Herrera, Helios
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
McMurray, Joseph C.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 798
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction. The marginal voter's curse presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter's curse. Moreover, marginal motivations are shown to dominate pivotal motivations in large elections. Model predictions are confirmed in a laboratory experiment and applied in a comparative analysis of electoral rules.
Subjects: 
Turnout
Information aggregation
Underdog effect
Experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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