Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175232 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 795
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper is a quantitative, equilibrium study of the insurance role of severance pay when workers face displacement risk and markets are incomplete. A key feature of our model is that, in line with an established empirical literature, job displacement entails a persistent fall in earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to the US economy. In contrast to previous studies that have analyzed severance payments in the absence of persistent earning losses, we find that the welfare gains from the insurance against job displacement afforded by severance pay are sizable.
Schlagwörter: 
Severance payments
Incomplete markets
Welfare
JEL: 
E24
D52
D58
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
553.74 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.