Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175180 
Is replaced by the following version: 
Title: 

Incentive regulation: Evidence from German electricity networks

The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s).

Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 18-010
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
We propose a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the impact of incentives on cost reduction. We show theoretically, and estimate empirically, that German electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) incur higher costs when subject to a lower-powered regulation mechanism. The difference is particularly significant (about 7%) for firms in the upper quartile of the efficiency distribution, a pattern which is consistent with the pooling of types under the threat of ratcheting.
Subjects: 
regulation
ratchet effect
electricity utilities
difference-in-differences
efficiency analysis
JEL: 
K23
L51
L94
L98
D24
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s) on: February 13, 2019


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