Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/174494 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2017/15
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization, but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency
Schlagwörter: 
punishment
public-goods-game
designated punishment
abuse
transparency
power
JEL: 
H41
C92
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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