Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174494
Authors: 
Hoeft, Leonard
Mill, Wladislaw
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017/15
Abstract: 
We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization, but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency
Subjects: 
punishment
public-goods-game
designated punishment
abuse
transparency
power
JEL: 
H41
C92
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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