Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/174414 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2017-05
Verlag: 
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, Amherst, MA
Zusammenfassung: 
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.
Schlagwörter: 
Nash equilibrium
exchange economies
intrinsic preferences for responsibility,
boundary problem
price-quantity mechanism
JEL: 
C72
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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