Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174351
Authors: 
Christens, Sven
Dannenberg, Astrid
Sachs, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 55-2017
Abstract: 
Revealing the identities of contributors has been shown to increase cooperation in public goods games. In this paper we experimentally investigate whether this finding holds true when decisions are made by groups rather than individuals. We distinguish between groups in which members can discuss face-to-face to reach a decision and groups in which members communicate via computer chat. The results confirm the positive effect of identification on cooperation among individuals. For groups, however, we only find a small and temporary effect of identification, irrespective of the type of communication. The reason for this is that the sensitivity to others' opinions plays an important role for individual decisions but not for group decisions.
Subjects: 
public goods experiment
cooperation
group decisions
face-to-face communication
computer chat communication
identification
shame
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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