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Autoren: 
Herold, Daniel
Datum: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 52-2017
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed on the agent.
Schlagwörter: 
moral hazard
incentive pay
corporate crime
cartels
JEL: 
D82
D86
L14
L22
K20
K21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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