Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174243
Authors: 
Tovar-García, Edgar Demetrio
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa [ISSN:] 1886-516X [Volume:] 21 [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 205-229
Abstract: 
Basel III proposes market discipline (banking disclosure requirements) as a key instrument to achieve soundness in the banking system. Consequently, it is necessary to test the presence of responses to bank risk on the part of the economic agents. This article empirically studies the mechanisms of market discipline (price, quantity, and maturity) in the interbank market: whether higher risk banks have to pay higher interest rate, and have less access to credit in the interbank market, especially for long maturity borrowing. Theoretically, bankers are well equipped to monitor other banks, but the interbank market also is a channel for contagion. Using a sample of 37 Mexican banks, from December 2008 to September 2012, and a dynamic panel model (SYS GMM estimator), I did not find evidence for discipline induced by peers.
Subjects: 
market discipline
interbank market
bank risk
contagion
Mexico
JEL: 
E59
G21
G39
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/es/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
765.91 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.