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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2017/11
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
I model the connection between the equilibrium bribe amount and the fines imposed on both bribe-taker and bribe-payer. I show that Basu's (2011) proposal to lower the fines imposed on bribe-payers in order to induce more whistleblowing and increase the probability of penalizing corrupt government officials might instead increase bribe amounts. Higher expected fines on bribe-takers will make them charge larger bribes; at the same time, lowering fines for bribe-paying might increase bribe-payers' willingness to pay bribes.
Schlagwörter: 
corruption
bribery
extortion
decentralization
fines
JEL: 
H8
K4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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