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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2016/13
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for the wallet game with two bidders. We prove that bidding twice the signal - the equilibrium strategy with continuous bid levels - is never an equilibrium in this set up. We show that partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate some separating and pooling equilibria with two and three discrete bid levels; we also compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria and thereby find the optimal bid levels in these cases.
Schlagwörter: 
Japanese-English auctions
wallet game
discrete bids
partitions
pooling equilibrium
separating equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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