Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/174027 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11117
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study the long-run impacts of health insurance promotion in Northern Ghana. We randomly provide three overlapping interventions to promote enrollment: subsidy, information campaign, and convenient sign-up option, with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. Our interventions, especially the subsidy, promote enrollment and healthcare service utilization in the short and long runs. We also find short-run health status improvements, which disappear in the long run. We find suggestive evidence on decreased investment in disease prevention and selection that may help explain this pattern of health status changes.
Subjects: 
health insurance
sustainability
moral hazard
selection
screening effect
randomized experiments
JEL: 
I1
O12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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