Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173745 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2017-01
Publisher: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Abstract: 
Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the belief-free equilibria is evolutionarily stable, and that in generic games none of these equilibria is neutrally stable. Moreover, in a large family of games (which includes many public good games), the belief-free equilibria fail to satisfy even a very mild stability refinement.
Subjects: 
belief-free equilibrium
evolutionary stability
private monitoring
repeated prisoner's dilemma
communication
JEL: 
C73
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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