Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173495
Authors: 
Bibow, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Levy Economics Institute 886
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the (lack of any lasting) impact of John Maynard Keynes's General Theory on economic policymaking in Germany. The analysis highlights the interplay between economic history and the history of ideas in shaping policymaking in postwar (West) Germany. The paper argues that Germany learned the wrong lessons from its own history and misread the true sources of its postwar success. Monetary mythology and the Bundesbank, with its distinctive anti-inflationary bias, feature prominently in this collective odyssey. The analysis shows that the crisis of the euro today is largely the consequence of Germany's peculiar anti-Keynesianism.
Subjects: 
John Maynard Keynes
Mercantilism
Economic and Monetary Union
Euro Crisis
JEL: 
B31
E30
E58
E65
N14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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